











The	term	‘product’	became	routinely	used	in	the	recording	industry	during	the	1980s,	and	the	occupational	title	of	‘product	manager’	became	more	widespread	as	the	strategic	approaches	of	marketing,	accounting	and	business	affairs	gained	ascendency	over	the	less	rationalised	and	‘instinctive’	practices	of	repertoire	management	(songwriting,	arranging	and	production)	and	talent	scouting	(see	Negus,	1992,	1999).	The	idea	of	popular	music	as	a	product	informed	theoretical	models,	whether	scholars	used	the	analogy	of	a	‘production	line’	(Ryan	&	Peterson,	1982)	or	a	‘systems	model’	of	raw	material	being	‘filtered’	as	it	‘flows’	through	a	series	of	gatekeepers	(Hirsch,	1972),	approaches	indebted	to	Theodor	Adorno’s	reference	to	the	‘assembly	line’	like	character	of	cultural	production.		Scholarly	models	of	products	and	production	lines	were	informed	by	empirical	realities	of	the	time.		 For	some	musicians,	the	notion	of	their	creative	work	as	‘product’	brought	to	mind	these	unsavoury	images	of	factories	and	assembly	lines.	Yet,	the	industry	was	organised	according	to	the	manufacture	of	tangible	artefacts.	Producing	recorded	music	required	the	maintenance	of	a	costly	infrastructure	of	record	pressing	plants	(later	security	ringed	CD	production	complexes),	warehouses,	inventory	management	systems,	and	a	complex	of	land,	sea	and	air	transportation	routes	and	hubs.			 The	manufacturing	and	distribution	process	could	not	idle	while	an	artist	took	their	time	to	deliver	a	track	or	an	album.	A	senior	executive	I	interviewed	in	April	1989	recalled	a	time	working	for	a	label	with	its	own	record	pressing	plant	and	explained:	‘I’d	get	a	call	from	manufacturing	and	they’d	say	“we	need	product”.	And	I’d	say	“well,	I	don’t	know	if	I	have	any”,	and	there’d	be	a	scream	down	the	phone.	If	I	didn’t	have	a	single	or	album	ready	I’d	have	to	find	one,	just	to	keep	the	machines	turning’	(Shepherd,	1989).	A	pressing	plant	needed	to	keep	staff	busy.	The	contracts	with	road	haulage	and	shipping	needed	fulfilling.		The	warehouse	space	needed	filling	and	emptying.	The	racks	on	the	retail	shelves	demanded	new	singles	and	albums,	whilst	unmarketable	product	went	to	traders	feeding	off	record	industry	‘failures’	by	selling	to	aficionados	of	the	‘bargain	bin.’		 The	term	‘product’	was	not	simply	an	ideological	distortion	of	a	purer	activity	of	artistic	creation	but	a	metonym	for	the	entire	way	that	commercial	recording	was	organised.	Production	and	product	-	the	specific	space	of	the	studio	and	the	more	general	manufacture	and	shipment	of	sound	carriers	-	mediated	the	composition,	consumption	
	 7	












	 The	recording	industry	and	YouTube	were	splitting	along	a	broader	schism.	On	one	side,	the	‘business	model’	of	investment	in	artistic	production,	remuneration	through	copyrights	and	unit	sales	within	the	recording	and	publishing	industries.	On	the	other	side,	a	model	of	generating	income	from	the	way	‘content’	attracts	advertising,	a	model	deployed	lucratively	by	the	new	digital	conglomerates	(and	drawing	on	the	earlier	use	of	advertising	to	finance	commercial	radio	and	television).		 Neal	Mohan	(2016),	Chief	Product	Officer	at	YouTube	and	Senior	Vice	President,	Google,	argued	that	YouTube	was	demonstrating	the	potential	of	advertising	generated	revenue.	He	claimed	that	80	per	cent	of	music	listeners	are	casual	listeners	and	it	is	these	that	can	generate	bulk	money	from	advertising,	rather	than	relying	on	revenues	generated	from	targeting	recordings	at	fans.	In	contrast	to	Mohan,	Joe	Lennon,	CEO	Subwoofr,	(to	cite	one	proponent	of	this	counter-argument),	claimed	that	advertising	requires	a	lot	more	consumption	to	generate	revenue.	Instead,	he	argued	against	targeting	casual	listeners	and	for	a	focus	on	fans,	directing	attention	at	those	actively	spending	money	on	music.	Drawing	on	research	by	Nielsen,	Lennon	(2016)	argued	that	40	per	cent	of	music	consumers	are	fans,	with	an	additional	category	of	aficionados	(a	lower	percentage	of	14	per	cent	of	music	consumers)	accounting	for	34	per	cent	of	recording	industry	revenues.		 Statistics	can	be	used	to	support	various	arguments.	If	these	numbers	are	treated	less	as	indicators	of	the	real	world	and	instead	as	business	constructions	that	are	used	in	imagining	and	disagreeing	about	the	markets	for	music,	what	we	have	here	are	arguments	about	the	characteristics	of	music	consumption,	and	the	most	viable	model	of	revenue	generation.	One	contention	is	that	the	music	industries	should	concentrate	on	the	habits	of	the	casual	music	listener;	the	person	satisfied	to	access	recordings	in	bundled	packages	or	‘free’	platforms	with	little	direct	economic	outlay.	It	is	in	this	area,	it	is	claimed,	that	large	revenues	can	be	generated	from	advertising	based	models.	In	contrast	is	the	assertion	that	it	is	more	advantageous	to	focus	efforts	on	analysing	and	targeting	the	activities	of	the	dedicated	aficionados,	those	who	invest	time	and	money	on	recordings	(digital	and	physical),	artefacts,	merchandise	and	concert	tickets.	Although	a	numerically	smaller	constituency	of	people,	fans	place	greater	importance	on	music,	are	more	committed	and	provide	the	most	reliable	source	of	revenue	for	the	traditional	sectors	of	recording,	publishing	and	live	performance.	This	‘model’	is	also	based	on	musicians’	experiences	and	
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	 In	contrast,	digital	conglomerates	are	driven	by	a	tougher	cocktail	of	ruthless	entrepreneurialism,	obsessive	corporate	imaging,	contractual	secrecy,	and	the	cult	of	personality	(Steve	Jobs,	Bill	Gates,	Mark	Zuckerberg,	Jeff	Bezos).	The	artistic	qualities	and	effort	that	has	gone	in	to	the	composition,	production	and	performance	of	music	are	irrelevant	to	how	digital	conglomerates	make	money.	As	I	have	argued,	the	dispute	between	musicians	and	YouTube	is,	at	one	profound	level,	about	recognising	the	artistic	relevance	and	social	value	of	music.	For	the	digital	conglomerates	music	is	‘content’	that	attracts	subscriptions	and	‘traffic’.	It	is	a	‘customer	engagement	tool’	(Seabrook,	2014).	Music	is	a	means	to	another	end	rather	than	an	end	in	itself.			 The	squabble	over	advertising	and	rights	may	have	created	waves	in	recording	and	publishing,	but	these	are	ripples	for	digital	conglomerates	when	considered	with	the	other	ways	they	generate	income.	The	emergent	tensions	that	I	have	been	referring	to	in	this	article	can	be	thrown	into	sharper	relief	by	considering,	albeit	schematically	given	space,	the	broader	ways	that	the	digital	conglomerates	generate	revenue.		 First,	is	the	generation	of	revenue	from	advertising,	with	Alphabet/	Google	and	Facebook	accounting	for	over	50	per	cent	of	global	internet	advertising	(Fortune,	2017).	Regular	reports	suggest	that	advertising	accounts	for	approximately	90	per	cent	of	Google/	Alphabet	and	95	per	cent	of	Facebook	income,	with	revenue	from	advertising	providing	significant	returns	for	Amazon	and	Microsoft	(Mosco,	2017).	Advertising	revenue	has	allowed	the	likes	of	Google	and	Facebook	to	build	corporate	structures	and	to	exert	influence.	But,	the	aspirations	of	the	digital	conglomerates	lead	way	beyond	advertising.	The	disputes	with	the	music	industry	should	be	considered	alongside	the	other	ways	in	which	these	corporations	are	generating	revenue	and	exerting	power	over	production	and	consumption.			 After	advertising,	an	important	way	that	revenue	is	generated	is	through	the	production	and	sales	of	physical	products.	Phones,	mobile	devices	and	laptops,	along	with	Beats	headphones,	have	been	central	to	the	financial	dominance	of	Apple,	and	important	for	Amazon	and	Google.	Digital	conglomerates	also	generate	revenues	from	the	production,	management	and	maintenance	of	servers	and	data	storage	systems,	used	by	many	big	corporations	along	with	governments	and	charities	(Mosco,	2014).	Cloud	
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computing	is	also	a	lucrative	source	of	revenue	for	Microsoft,	shrewdly	making	its	business	applications	software	(word	processing,	spread	sheets)	ever	more	integrated	into	cloud	computing,	and	Amazon	whose	Web	Services	cloud	computing	network	has	become	the	‘global	leader	in	cloud	computing’	(Mosco,	2017,	p70).	Amazon’s	involvement	in	physical	products	also	encompasses	digital	retailing	of	ever	more	consumer	luxuries	and	daily	necessities,	a	domain	in	which	it	has	been	able	to	exert	an	almost	near	monopoly.			 Digital	conglomerates	are	expanding	their	portfolios	through	research	and	development	spending	(invested	at	a	strategic	loss)	in	new	products	that	are	predicated	upon	entering	production	and	being	sold	within	coming	years.	This	includes	types	of	virtual	and	immersive	technology,	robotics,	‘intelligent’	electric	automobiles,	banking	systems,	information	management,	artificial	intelligence,	and	heath	care	systems.	Big	tech	companies	are	using	their	expertise	and	access	to	sophisticated	skills	in	technology	and	engineering,	hardware	and	software,	often	through	strategic	alliances	(such	as	that	between	Facebook,	Walmart	and	Uber,	or	Amazon’s	many	deals	with	third	parties),	and	exploiting	their	access	to	labourers	mining	raw	materials	in	Africa,	or	working	on	assembly	lines	in	Asia.		 Digital	conglomerates	exert	further	influence	and	generate	income	through	the	production,	acquisition	and	curatorial	mediation	of	apps	and	software.	Dominated	by	Apple	and	Google,	the	revenues	generated	by	the	‘app	economy’	in	the	USA	are	estimated	to	be	greater	than	Hollywood,	with	Apple	figures	suggesting	that	the	App	Store	was	supporting	627,000	jobs	compared	with	374,000	employed	in	jobs	created	by	Hollywood	(Meyer,	2015).	The	app	economy	is	expected	to	grow	considerably,	not	only	in	leisure	activities	such	as	games,	personal	communication	and	the	sharing	of	images,	but	in	apps	used	widely	in	workplaces,	schools,	college	and	universities,	in	navigation,	and	in	finance	and	banking.	The	expansion	of	the	app	economy	is,	in	turn,	entwined	with	an	obsessive	investment	in	the	potential	of	an	‘internet	of	things’	summarised	by	Vincent	Mosco	as	‘a	system	for	measuring,	monitoring,	and	controlling	the	activity	of	objects	and	living	organisms	through	sensors	that	gather,	process,	and	report	data	over	networks’	(2017,	p39).		 One	stark	consequences	of	this	broader	corporate	context	is	the	simple	fact	that	recorded	music	is	insignificant	within	the	broader	digital	economy.	Presenting	figures	
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from	2013	to	2016	(along	with	future	projections)	Mark	Mulligan	provided	evidence	suggesting	that	‘music’s	role	in	the	global	digital	content	marketplace	is	small	and	shrinking’	(2016b,	np).	The	financial	value	of	digital	recorded	music	is	slight	and	declining	as	a	percentage	share	in	relation	to	apps	and	videos.	This	is	perhaps	an	obvious	reason	why	the	big	tech	companies	(such	as	Google	and	Amazon)	are	prepared	to	invest	in	the	production	of	videos	for	vloggers,	along	with	movies	and	screen	drama	but	not	in	the	production	of	music.	Not	only	is	recorded	music	relatively	insignificant	within	the	overall	digital	economy,	access	to	listening	is	often	purchased	as	a	generic	subscription	to	a	bundle	of	content	and	apps,	often	packaged	with	a	phone	or	mobile	device.	The	recording	is	not	chosen	and	purchased	as	an	entity	in	itself,	but	is	accessed	and	paid	for	within	an	overall	fee	for	generic	‘data	usage’.		 Yet,	at	the	moment	when	music	becomes	less	significant	as	a	recorded	art	within	the	broader	app	and	content	economy,	its	very	use	as	data	means	that	it	begins	to	gain	importance	within	‘data	capitalism’.	Digital	conglomerates	exploit	recorded	music	as	part	of	the	production,	analysis,	packaging	and	selling	of	data,	and	in	the	management	of	data	for	third	parties	(labels,	publishers	etc.).	Information	derived	from	the	circulation	and	use	of	music	becomes	integrated	in	to	a	system	within	which	digital	conglomerates	harness	‘big	data’	to	comprehend,	control	and	anticipate	behaviour	through	forms	of	‘digital	positivism’	(Mosco,	2014).			 Robert	Prey	has	highlighted	how	‘all	listening	time	is	data-generating	time’	(2016,	p32).	Jeremy	Wade	Morris	(2015b)	has	made	a	similar	point	when	stressing	how	media	metrics	companies	manufacture	‘commodity	communities’	as	they	package	and	sell	audience	data	to	other	companies.	Digital	music	can	provide	three	distinct	types	of	data.			 First,	is	data	about	the	characteristics	of	listeners	identified	by	such	criteria	as	location,	time	of	accessing	music,	repeated	listens	to	the	same	track	or	artist,	adjustment	of	volume,	range	of	musical	preference	(eclectic,	narrow,	new	or	old	artists),	and	all	manner	of	patterns	of	related	hardware,	software	and	internet	activity.	Listener	engagement	with	specific	genres,	artists	or	songs	can	be	cross-correlated	with	significant	events	(military	conflict,	royal	wedding),	controversial	news	stories,	marketing	campaigns	or	a	performer’s	touring	and	promotional	activities.			
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Second,	digital	music	consumption	provides	the	opportunity	for	‘semantic	analysis	of	online	conversations	about	music’	(Prey,	2016,	p33).	This	entails	collecting	and	analysing	the	words	used	and	descriptions	about	musicians	and	bands	in	articles,	reviews,	blogs,	forums	and	across	social	media	platforms.	This	is	sifted	and	can	be	reduced	to	recurring	keywords,	and	dissected	to	construct	networks	or	webs	of	connections	between	artists,	between	songs	and	between	listeners	in	different	places.	Semantic	data	research	also	includes	collecting	and	analysing	the	compilation	of	playlists	by	users	and	exploiting	the	links	that	listeners	make	between	music	and	activity,	such	as	cleaning,	school	work,	rainy	days,	late	night,	running,	commute.			 Third,	is	the	analysis	of	the	sonic	content	of	digital	music	whereby	individual	songs	or	tracks	can	be	analysed	and	compared	for	obvious	traits	such	as	melody,	harmony,	rhythm	and	pitch,	along	with	the	instruments	used,	gender	of	vocalist	and	stylistic	characteristics,	such	as	danceability	or	use	of	distortion.	Pandora	Internet	Radio’s	Music	Genome	Project	makes	use	of	teams	of	musicologists	to	collect	details	of	every	track	according	to	450	identifiable	characteristics	(although	not	all	are	applied	to	every	genre	or	recording).	The	Echo	Nest	(now	owned	by	Spotify)	analyses	data	from	approximately	40	million	songs	and	also	allows	the	analysis	of	tracks	and	makes	available	various	apps	that	allow	consumers	to	link	to	related	songs	and	styles.			 Sonic	analytics	are	used	to	algorithmically	manipulate	streamed	listening	behaviour,	making	it	appear	more	‘personal’	by	providing	constant	suggestions,	and	by	allowing	listeners	to	engage	in	novelties	related	to	their	listening	(accessing	sequences	of	songs	with	the	same	beat,	taking	a	sonic	journey	to	related	genres),	flattering	the	individual	on	their	unique	profile.	This	data	is	also	cross-referenced	and	combined	with	semantic	and	listener	data	when	linking	listener	activities	to	the	interests	of	advertisers.	For	example,	data	collected	on	individual	listeners	is	reconfigured	by	Pandora	and	sold	to	advertisers	as	‘2300	targetable	audience	segments’	(Prey,	2017,	p8).			 Due	to	the	amount	of	data	being	produced,	the	structuring	of	various	deals,	alliances	and	collaborative	ventures	between	companies	in	the	big	tech	sector,	this	data	can	then	be	combined	with,	or	cross-referenced	and	‘migrated’	to	other	data	sets.	This	can	then	lead	to	‘function	creep’	whereby	data	and	technology	that	is	developed	for	one	apparent	use	is	deployed	more	widely	with	other	data,	a	practice	that	has	caused	concern	
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in	discussions	of	government	surveillance,	privacy	and	human	rights	(see	Bernal,	2016).	Music	listening	data	by	itself	can	be	used	to	predict	streaming	and	purchasing	behaviour,	to	mitigate	corporate	anxiety	about	uncertainty	through	‘risk	management’	(Negus,	2014)	and	to	generate	income	when	sold	on	to	advertisers	(seeking	to	place	ads	for	sportswear	or	automobiles	alongside	playlists).	It	can	also	be	correlated	with	a	‘bewildering	array’	of	other	indicators	when	data	miners	seek	predictors	of	credit	worthiness,	home	ownership	or	leisure	activities	(Prey,	2016).			 The	post-record	music	industry	offers	an	abundance	of	data	that	is	exploited	by	digital	conglomerates	and	infomediaries.	The	dispute	about	whether	revenue	is	more	fairly	extracted	from	advertising	or	the	enforcement	of	copyrights	is	just	one	scuffle	within	a	broader	set	of	tensions	about	the	value	of	recorded	music,	the	characteristics	that	make	it	valuable	and	the	way	worth	should	be	acknowledged,	both	culturally	and	economically.			 Musicians,	labels	and	publishers	have	been	campaigning	for	recorded	music	to	be	recognised	for	its	creative	and	artistic	value	(rather	than	as	content	that	attracts	traffic)	and	to	be	accorded	greater	economic	reward.	As	the	digital	conglomerates	continue	to	influence	the	conditions	within	which	music	is	circulated	and	consumed,	there	are	further	conflicts	imminent	about	how	musicians	and	music	companies	should	be	recompensed	for	the	data	value	of	their	music.	
	
Diversity	and	divergence	in	the	post-record	music	industries		In	the	post-record	music	industries	the	recording	is	displaced	–	as	art	form,	as	artefact,	as	tangible	commodity.	Musicians	still	make	recordings,	and	these	are	commodified	in	new	and	in	old	ways.	But,	the	record	is	no	longer	central	in	determining	the	scope	and	success	of	publishing	repertoires,	live	tours,	the	demand	for	merchandise,	studio	budgets	and	the	media	appearances	of	performers.	The	recording	-	on	CD,	as	download,	as	stream	-	loses	worth	as	industrial	product,	as	a	saleable	tangible	commodity	and	as	a	cultural	symbol.	Within	the	digital	economy	recording	acquires	new	exchange	values	as	content	and	as	data	commodity,	and	new	use	values	for	consumers	in	the	ubiquitous	sonic	stream	(through	subscriptions,	apps,	playlists	for	leisure	activities	and	so	on).			
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As	musicians	and	music	companies	abandon	their	dependence	upon	income	from	recordings,	and	pursue	multiple	sources	of	revenue,	so	the	music	industries	become	less	unified,	less	dependent	upon	a	shared	stake	in	recording	as	the	route	to	success,	and	more	splintered	into	sectional	interests.	This	can	be	illustrated	with	two	examples	from	different	parts	of	the	world	–	the	UK	and	China.			In	its	Measuring	Music	Report	(2017),	UK	Music	-	the	trade	organisation	that	represents	music	companies	-	recognises	this	lack	of	unity	by	dividing	the	‘music	industry’	into	six	‘core	sectors.’	These	are	musicians,	composers,	songwriters	and	lyricists;	recorded	music;	live	music;	music	publishing;	music	representatives;	music	producers,	recording	studios	and	staff.	The	core	sectors	are	further	broken	down	in	to	‘sub	sectors’.	So,	for	example,	recorded	music	is	sub-divided	into	three	categories	(record	labels;	online	music	distributors;	design	and	manufacture	of	physical	product	and	packaging).	Live	music	is	broken	down	into	four	categories	(music	festival	organisers,	music	promoters,	music	agents;	production	services	for	live	music;	ticketing	agents;	concert	venues	and	arenas).	In	2016	recording	was	contributing	14	per	cent	of	total	music	industry	revenues	to	the	UK	economy,	with	live	music	at	23	per	cent.	Recording	accounted	for	only	6	per	cent	of	those	employed	within	the	UK	‘music	industry’	(UK	Music,	2017).	UK	Music,	whilst	seeking	to	lobby	and	campaign	on	behalf	of	a	coherent	singular	‘music	industry’	recognises	that	recording	is	only	one	component	part	of	this	industry.		 In	a	similar	way,	the	2017	China	Music	Industry	Development	Report	(CUC,	2017)	divides	the	music	industry	into	three	‘segment	industries’:	A	‘core	layer’	contains	music	books	and	audiovisual	publishing	industry;	music	performance	industry;	music	copyright	brokerage	and	management;	digital	music	industry.	A	‘link	layer’	is	made	up	of	musical	instrument	industry;	music	education	and	training	industry;	professional	audio	industry.	An	‘expanding	layer’	contains	radio	and	TV	music	industry;	karaoke	industry;	film,	television,	drama,	games,	animation	music.	The	digital	music	industry	accounts	for	16	per	pent	of	total	revenues,	with	Karaoke	accounting	for	27	per	cent,	musical	instruments	at	12	per	cent	and	music	books	and	audiovisual	publishing	(physical	artefacts)	at	under	half	a	per	cent.		 Only	taking	examples	from	two	territories	shows	that	recording	is	one	element	within	the	overall	music	industries	(it	would	be	instructive	to	broaden	these	comparisons	
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with	other	music	industries	around	the	world).	It	also	illustrates	how	the	music	industries	in	anyone	place	are	shaped	by	the	interplay	of	cultural	and	commercial	contexts.	Important	core	industry	sectors	in	China	do	not	feature	in	UK	Music’s	core	music	sectors,	for	example.	Although	the	Communist	Party	of	China,	through	various	committees	and	councils,	seeks	to	‘strengthen	the	integration	of	the	music	industry	with	other	industries’	(p17),	and	although	UK	Music	has	a	political	mission	to	‘represent	the	collective	interests	of	the	recorded,	published	and	live	arms	of	the	British	music	industry’	(as	stated	on	its	website),	it	is	no	longer	plausible	to	argue	for	a	‘music	industry’	characterised	by	a	concentration	of	shared	interests	(Azenha,	2006)	or	strategically	advantageous	structures	of	‘vertical’	and	‘horizontal	integration’	(Bishop,	2005).			The	music	industries	are	active	through	specific	businesses	and	companies,	interest	groups,	occupations	and	organisations,	and	these	may	be	grouped	into	loosely	themed	sectors	or	layers.	These	sectors	operate	within	looser	competing	and	collaborating	networks,	portfolios	of	businesses	structured	according	to	multiple	rights	models,	and	strategic	alliances.			These	disunified	music	industries	face	challenges	from	‘digital	positivism’	(Mosco,	2014)	as	the	digital	conglomerates	(and	nation	states)	seek	to	comprehend	and	manipulate	the	behaviour	of	musicians	and	listeners	by	extracting	and	using	data	derived	from	the	production,	circulation	and	use	of	recording.	But	the	post-record	music	industry	benefits,	as	do	all	music	industries,	from	the	way	music	continues	to	be	created	and	performed,	continues	to	be	created	and	performed,	exchanged	and	acclaimed,	experienced	and	enjoyed,	in	ways	that	escape	the	reduction	of	our	lives	to	data.		
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